Problems / AI security and governance, hard
A web-search assistant retrieves pages that contain hidden instructions. 300 poisoned requests a second arrive alongside real users.
Free to open. Runs in your browser, no sign-up.
Success ≥ 98%, block ≥ 95% of the injections.
15 requests a second for 30 seconds: 100% request (reads).
What each component does in this design, and what calls it. The simulator mimics each one from these settings.
| Component | Its job here | Settings |
|---|---|---|
| Load balancerLoad balancer | Traffic enters here.Calls AI app.Layer 4 balancers route by IP and port; layer 7 balancers read HTTP and can route by path or header. | – |
| AI appApp service | Load balancer forwards to it.Calls Web search, Model.Little's law: throughput ≈ concurrency ÷ latency. 200 slots at 50 ms serve about 4,000 req/s. | 3 replicas × 500 slots · timeout 30 s |
| Web searchHybrid search | AI app calls it.Hybrid search combines keyword matching (BM25) with vector similarity. | 2000 slots · 2 steps |
| ModelLLM endpoint | AI app calls it.Latency has two parts: time to the first token, then a steady stream of tokens per second. | 3000 streams |
Try it first. Open one hint at a time if you get stuck.
Retrieved text is untrusted input too.
Look at what got through, or what was wrongly blocked: which filter is responsible for this kind of traffic?
Put a prompt-injection filter in front.